UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES FILOSÓFICAS

Miguel Ángel Sebastián es doctor en filosofía por la Universidad de Barcelona donde realizo su tesis dentro del grupo Logos. Se incorporó a la UNAM en el 2012 como postdoc y es investigador del Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas desde el 2014. Sus principales áreas de interés son la filosofía de la mente y las ciencias cognitivas, especialmente en temas relacionados con la consciencia, la subjetividad, la atención y teorías naturalistas el contenido mental. El Dr. Sebastián también tiene intereses en metafísica y filosofía del lenguaje.

https://www.scc-philab.com/sebastian

ARTÍCULOS PUBLICADOS

Sebastián (2022) First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem. Erkenntnis 

Sebastián & Okón (2022) The Subjective-Objective Collapse Model: Virtues and Challenges in S. Gao (ed.) Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press 

Sebastián (2021) First‐person representations and responsible agency in AI. Synthese.

Sebastián (2022) Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About It: Confusions, Virtues and Challenges of Higher-order Theories en J. Weisberg (ed.) Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  

Sebastián (2020b) Conciencia, primera persona y contenido no conceptual. En Pelaez, A. y Cervieri, I. (ed.) Contenido y fenomenología de la percepción. Aproximaciones filosóficas. Gedisa.  

Sebastián (2020) Perspectival Self-Consciousness and Ego-Dissolution: an analysis of (some) altered states of consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1(I):9  

Sebastián (2019) Subjective Character, the Ego and De Se Representation: Phenomenological, Metaphysical and Representational Considerations on Pre-reflective Self-awareness ProtoSociology 36: 12  

Sebastián & Okón (2018) A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model. Synthese.  

Sebastián & Artiga (2018) Informational Theories of Content and Mental Representation. Review in Philosophy and Psychology.

Sebastián (2018e) Embodied Appearance Properties and Subjectivity. Adaptative Behaviour

Sebastián (2018d) Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order theories. Phil. Studies

Sebastián (2018c) Teorías de la Consciencia. Enciclopedia SEFA de Filosofía Analítica

Sebastián (2018b) Consciencia. Enciclopedia SEFA de Filosofía Analítica

Sebastián (2018a) Access, Phenomenology and Sorites. Ratio

Sebastián & Artiga (2017) Can Informational Theories Account for Metarepresentation?. Topoi

Sebastián (2017d) “Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo”. Crítica

Sebastián (2017c) “On a confusion about which intuitions to trust: from the hard problem to a not easy one”. Topoi Vol.36(1), 31-40

Sebastian (2017b) “Los sueños y el estudio científico de la consciencia” en Diaz, Jimenez and Mueller (eds.), La naturaleza de los sueños. Herder

Sebastián (2017a) “Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science. 16(2):317-336

Sebastián (2016b) “Cognitive Access and Cognitive Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Issues” Philosophical Explorations 19(2): 188-204.

Sebastián (2016a) “Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a common theory?” Theoria Volume 31, pp.73- 89.

Sebastián & Okón (2016a) “How to (Back Up or) Refute (certain) Quantum Theories of Consciousness” Mind and Matter Vol. 14(1), pp. 25–42

Sebastián & Okón (2016b) “Rejoinder to Filk” Mind and Matter Vol. 14(1), p. 49

Sebastián (2015a) “What Panpsychists should reject. On the incompatibility of Panpsychism and Organizational Invariantism” Philosophical Studies, Volume 172, Issue 7, pp 1833-1846

Sebastián (2015b) “Borderline experiences one cannot undergo” Crítica, Vol. 47, Issue 140: 31-42

Sebastián & Sanchez (2015) “Attention Alters Appearances and Solves the ’Many-Many Problem’: Implications for Research in Skill Acquisition and Execution”. European Journal of Human Movement, Vol. 34:156-179.

Sebastián (2014a) “Dreams an Empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non- cognitive theories of consciousness”. Synthese, Vol. 191, Issue 2: 263-285

Sebastián (2012/2014b) “Experiential Awareness: Do you Prefer It to Me?” Philosophical Topics, Vol 40. N° 2: 155-177

Sebastián (2014c) “Not a HOT dream” In R. Brown (ed.). Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Studies in Brain and Mind. Springer Press. ISBN 978-94-007-6001-1

Sebastián (2014d) “There is nothing HOT in our dreams: reply to Ivanowich and Weisberg” In R. Brown (ed.). Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Studies in Brain and Mind. Springer Press. ISBN 978-94-007-6001-1

Sebastián (2008) “Are Factivity and Modal Closure a problem for Knowability?” in X. Arrazola, J.M. Larrazabal et al. (eds.), Logkca-07. Proceedings of the first ILCLI International Workshop on Logic and Philosophy of Knowledge, Communication and Action. EHU-UPV. ISBN: 8498600227 ISBN- 13: 9788498600223

 LIBROS PUBLICADOS

Sebastián (2022) El problema de la consciencia. Una introducción crítica a la discusión filosófica actual. Madrid, Ediciones Cátedra. Teorema, Serie Mayor ISBN 978-84-376-4272-7

REVISIÓN DE LIBROS

“The Extended Mind” de A. Clark and C. Chalmers. Dianoia, vol LIX, No. 72. May 2014

 “Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory” de Uriah Kriegel. Disputatio, vol IV. No 32. May 2012.

DIVULGACIÓN FILOSÓFICA

Sebastián & Pena-Martínez (2018) “Filosofía para viajar en el tiempo”. Revista de la Universidad de México.

Sebastian & Martinez (2013) “Smoking Subs and Eating Joints: what counts as true in Fiction” En Lorenzo von Matterhorn (ed.), How I met your mother and Philosophy. Blackwell.