"Mereological Indeterminacy at Logically Determinate Worlds"

Abstract: I argue that neither vague parthood nor vague composition requires vague identity, vague existence, or vagueness in how many things there are--both parthood and composition may be vague at worlds where identity, existence, and cardinality are not vague. I suggest that this holds independently of any views one might have on the source
or nature of vagueness--it holds solely in virtue of general distinctions I've defended elsewhere between mereological and spatiotemporal relations among material things. This
points at a new way of defending vague parthood and vague composition against influential objections in the literature. More generally, it's a key step towards a new understanding of the connection between matters of mereology, on the one hand, and matters of logic and ontology, on the other: that we may have vagueness in the former without vagueness in the latter suggests that such a connection is not nearly as straightforward as it has been thought to be.