Mario Gómez-Torrente
Research
“Reference Fixing and the Paradoxes”, in M. Petrolo and G. Venturi (eds.), Paradoxes between Truth
and Proof, Springer, Cham, forthcoming
·
last pre-publication version
“Rigidity
and Necessary Application”, Noûs, forthcoming
“El lenguaje
de los colores”, in I.
Vicario (ed.), Filosofía del Lenguaje, Tecnos, Madrid, forthcoming
·
last pre-publication version
“Modal Realism and Anthropic Reasoning”, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming
·
last pre-publication version
“The Sorites, Content
Fixing, and the Roots of Paradox”, in O. Bueno and A. Abasnezhad
(eds.), On the Sorites Paradox, Springer, Cham, forthcoming
“El concepto de verdad en la tradición analítica. Una mirada a las teorías principales”, in J. Villacrés and E. C. Apolo (eds.), Una Introducción a la Filosofía Analítica, Universidad Central del Ecuador, Quito, forthcoming
·
last pre-publication version
“Alfred Tarski”, first substantive revision, in D.
Pritchard (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy, Oxford University
Press, New York, 2023, URL = <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/
document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0186.xml>
“Alfred Tarski”, fourth substantive revision, in E. Zalta
(ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2023 Edition, URL
= <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/tarski/>
(editor, with
Axel Barceló) M. Ezcurdia, Complejidad y Ambigüedad, Instituto
de Investigaciones Filosóficas-U.N.A.M., Mexico City,
2022, 294 pp.
“Roads to Anti-Descriptivism (about Reference Fixing):
Replies to Soames, Raatikainen, and Devitt”, Philosophical
Studies, vol. 179, 2022, pp. 1005-1017
“Précis of Roads to Reference”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 179, 2022, pp. 973-976
“Logical Truth”, fourth substantive revision, in E. Zalta
(ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2022 Edition, URL
= <http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/win2022/entries/logical-truth/>
“The Problem of Logical Constants and the Semantic
Tradition: From Invariantist Views to a Pragmatic
Account”
(long version). A short version appears in J. Woods and G. Sagi (eds.), The Semantic Conception of Logic: Essays on Consequence,
Invariance, and Meaning, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2021, pp. 35-54
“Sobre el regreso de Carroll, el convencionalismo, y los fundamentos de la lógica”, Análisis Filosófico, vol. 40 (no. especial), 2020, pp. 111-131
“Logical Form, Truth Conditions, and Adequate
Formalization”,
Disputatio, vol. 12 (no. 58), 2020,
pp. 209-222
“Términos de clases naturales”, en E. García Ramírez (comp.), La Estructura del Significado. Una Introducción a la Filosofía del Lenguaje Contemporánea, U.N.A.M.-Colofón, Mexico City, 2020, pp. 197-211
“Referencia y rigidez”, in E. García Ramírez (ed.), La Estructura del Significado. Una Introducción a la Filosofía del Lenguaje Contemporánea, U.N.A.M.-Colofón, Mexico City, 2020, pp. 55-69
“Ordinary Kinds and Ontological Angst. Reply to Demartini”, Manuscrito, vol. 43 (no. 4), 2020, pp. 215-220
“Do Conflicting Intentions Give Rise to Multiple
Demonstrative Reference? Reply to Mena”, Manuscrito, vol. 43 (no. 4), 2020, pp. 189-198
“Numerals, Positionality, and Reference Fixing. Reply to
Vivanco”, Manuscrito, vol.
43 (no. 4), 2020, pp. 165-176
“Demonstrative Contents and Opaque Thoughts. Reply to
Valente”, Manuscrito, vol.
43 (no. 4), 2020, pp. 130-141
“On the Ordinary Notion of Substance. Reply to Abreu
Zavaleta”, Manuscrito, vol.
43 (no. 4), 2020, pp. 108-115
“On Descriptivism and Natural Kind Terms. Reply to
Fernández Moreno”, Manuscrito,
vol. 43 (no. 4), 2020, pp. 86-96
“Are Conflicting Reference-Fixing Intentions Possible?
Reply to Martone”, Manuscrito,
vol. 43 (no. 4), 2020, pp. 59-73
“Ceteris Paribus Provisos,
Knowledge of Reference-Fixing Conventions, and Proper Names. Reply to Orlando”, Manuscrito, vol. 43 (no. 4),
2020, pp. 35-48
“Context-Sensitive Reference Fixing and Objectivity. Reply
to Barceló”,
Manuscrito,
vol. 43 (no. 4), 2020, pp. 13-21
Roads to Reference. An Essay on Reference Fixing in
Natural Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019
· last pre-publication version of chapter 1: “Reference:
Problems and Promises”
“Soames on the Logical Empiricists on Truth,
Meaning, Convention, and Logical Truth”, Philosophical Studies, vol.
176, 2019, pp. 1357-1365
· last pre-publication
version
“Alfred
Tarski”,
third substantive revision, in E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Spring 2019 Edition, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2019/entries/tarski/>
“Sobre la función de la teoría de modelos y el significado de la teoría de
conjuntos”, in M. Freund, M. Fernández de Castro and
M. Ruffino (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Logic:
Recent Trends in Latin America and Spain, College Publications, London, 2018, pp. 89-101
“Logical Truth”, third substantive revision, in E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2018 Edition, URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2018/entries/logical-truth/>
“¿Qué es la verdad?”, Encuentros 2050, vol. 2 (no. 14), 2018,
pp. 8-10
“Semantics vs. Pragmatics in Impure Quotation”,
in P. Saka and M. Johnson (eds.), The Semantics and Pragmatics of Quotation,
Springer, Cham, 2017, pp. 135-16
· last pre-publication
version
“Objectivism about Color and Comparative Color
Statements. Reply to Hansen”, Noûs, vol. 51
(no. 2), 2017, pp. 429-435
· last pre-publication
version
“Introducción a la Parte I: Lógica”, in G. Frege, Escritos sobre lógica,
semántica y filosofía de las matemáticas, edited by M. M. Valdés, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-U.N.A.M., Mexico
City, 2016, pp. 19-37
“Perceptual Variation, Color Language, and
Reference Fixing. An Objectivist Account”,
Noûs, vol. 50 (no. 1), 2016, pp. 3-40
· last pre-publication
version
“On the Essence and Identity of Numbers”, Theoria, vol. 30 (no. 3), 2015, pp. 317-329
“Quantifiers and Referential
Use”, in A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and
Quantifiers, Springer,
Dordrecht, 2015, pp.
97-124
· last pre-publication
version
“Alfred Tarski”, second substantive revision,
in E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2015
Edition, URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/tarski/>
“Logical Truth”, second substantive revision,
in E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2014
Edition, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2014/entries/logical-truth/>
“La paradoja sorites”, in E. Barrio (ed.), Paradojas, paradojas y más paradojas,
College Publications,
London, 2014, pp. 287-301
“Alfred Tarski”, in D. Pritchard (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy,
Oxford University Press, New York, 2014
“How Quotations Refer”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 110 (no. 7), 2013, pp. 353-390
· last pre-publication
version
“The Private Language Argument and the Analogy
between Rules and Grounds”, in M.-H. Lee (ed.), Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy. Vol. 39.
Philosophy of Language, online e-book, Philosophy
Documentation Center, Charlottesville (Virginia), 2012, pp.
49-54
· last pre-publication
version
“Tarski on Variable Domains”, in M.-H. Lee
(ed.), Proceedings of the XXII World
Congress of Philosophy. Vol. 13. Logic and Philosophy of Logic, online
e-book, Philosophy Documentation Center,
Charlottesville (Virginia), 2012, pp. 47-52
“Kripke on Color Words and the
Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction”, in A. Berger (ed.), Saul Kripke, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2011, pp. 290-323
· last pre-publication
version
“What Quotations Refer To”, in E. Brendel, J. Meibauer and M. Steinbach (eds.), Understanding Quotation, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlín
& New York, 2011, pp. 139-160
·
last
pre-publication version
“Alfred Tarski”, first substantive revision, in
E. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Spring 2011 Edition, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2011/entries/tarski/>
“Constante lógica”, in L. Vega and P. Olmos
(eds.), Compendio de Lógica,
Argumentación y Retórica, Trotta,
Madrid, 2011, pp. 129-134
“Logical Truth”, first substantive revision, in E. Zalta
(ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Summer 2010 Edition, URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/ entries/logical-truth/>
“The Sorites, Linguistic
Preconceptions, and the Dual Picture of Vagueness”, in R. Dietz and S. Moruzzi
(eds.), Cuts and Clouds, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010,
pp. 228-253
· last pre-publication
version
“On Quoting the Empty Expression”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 148 (no. 3), 2010, pp. 439-443
“Rereading Tarski on Logical Consequence”, Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 2 (no. 2), 2009, pp. 249-297
“El lenguaje del color y la
objetividad del color”, in P. Quintanilla (ed.), Ensayos de Metafilosofía, Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del
Perú, Lima, 2009, pp. 193-206
“Essentiality and Theoretical Identifications. Reply to
Ahmed”, Mind, vol. 118 (no. 469), 2009, pp.
135-148
Review of C. Hughes, Kripke: Names, Necessity, and
Identity,
in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 76 (no. 1), 2008, pp.
219-222
“Are There Model-Theoretic Logical
Truths that Are not Logically True?”, in D. Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008,
pp. 340-368
· last pre-publication version
“Interpretaciones y conjuntos”,
in A. García de la Sienra (ed.), Filosofía de la Lógica. Reflexiones sobre la Paradoja de Orayen, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-U.N.A.M., Mexico
City, 2008, pp. 207-221
“Constantes logicas”,
in M. J. Frápolli (ed.), Filosofía de la Lógica,
Tecnos, Madrid, 2007, pp. 179-205
· last pre-publication
version
“Las palabras lógicas de Raúl Orayen”,
in M. Ezcurdia (ed.), Orayen. De la Forma
Lógica al Significado, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-U.N.A.M.,
Mexico City, 2007, pp. 47-59
“Alfred Tarski”, in E. Zalta (ed.), The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Winter 2006 Edition, URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2006/entries/tarski/>
“Rigidity and Essentiality”, Mind, vol. 115 (no. 458), 2006, pp. 227-259
“Logical Truth”, in E. Zalta (ed.), The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2006 Edition, URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2006/entries/logical-truth/>
Review of W. Künne, Conceptions of Truth, in Philosophical Quarterly,
vol. 55 (no. 219), 2005, pp. 371-373
“El Wittgenstein de Kripke y la analogía entre reglas y
fundamentos”, Diánoia, vol. 50 (no. 55), 2005, pp. 55-94
“Remarks on Impure Quotation”, in P.
De Brabanter (ed.), Hybrid Quotations (Belgian
Journal of Linguistics 2003 Yearbook, vol. 17), John Benjamins,
Amsterdam, 2005, pp. 129-151
· last pre-publication version
“Beyond
Rigidity? Essentialist Predication and the Rigidity of General Terms”, Crítica,
vol. 36 (no. 108), 2004, pp. 37-54
“La noción de consecuencia lógica”, in R. Orayen and A. Moretti (eds.), Enciclopedia
Iberoamericana de Filosofía: Filosofía de la Lógica, Trotta,
Madrid, 2004, pp. 143-178
“The
Indefinability of Truth in the Wahrheitsbegriff”, Annals of Pure and Applied
Logic, vol. 126 (nos. 1-3), 2004, pp. 27-37
“The ‘Must’ and the ‘Heptahedron’. Remarks on Remarks”, Theoria, vol. 18/2 (no.
47), 2003, pp. 199-206
“Logical Consequence
and Logical Expressions”, Theoria, vol. 18/2 (no. 47), 2003, pp. 131-144
“Notas sobre la paradoja de Orayen”,
in A. Moretti and G. Hurtado (eds.), La Paradoja de Orayen,
Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 2003, pp. 83-94
· last pre-publication
version
“The Problem of Logical Constants”, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 8 (no.1), 2002, pp. 1-37
“Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles”, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, vol. 64 (no. 1), 2002, pp. 107-125
“Notas sobre el Wahrheitsbegriff,
II”, Análisis
Filosófico, vol. 21 (no. 2), 2001, pp. 149-185
“Notas sobre el Wahrheitsbegriff,
I”, Análisis
Filosófico, vol. 21 (no. 1), 2001, pp. 5-41
“Quotation Revisited”, Philosophical
Studies, vol. 102 (no. 2), 2001,
pp. 123-153
Forma y Modalidad. Una Introducción al
Concepto de Consecuencia Lógica, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 2000, 110 pp.
“A Note on Formality and Logical Consequence”, Journal of Philosophical Logic,
vol. 29 (no. 5), 2000, pp. 529-539
“Consecuencialismo e incertidumbre”, in C. Trueba
(ed.): Racionalidad: lenguaje,
argumentación y acción, U.A.M.-Plaza y
Valdés Editores, Mexico City, 2000,
pp. 277-293
Review of J. Dawson, Logical
Dilemmas. The Life and Work of Kurt Gödel, in Isis, vol. 89 (no. 2), 1998, pp. 356-357. (Correction: Isis, vol. 90 (no. 1), 1999, pp. 96-97)
“Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth”, Synthèse, vol. 117 (no. 3), 1998/1999, pp. 375-408
“On a Fallacy
Attributed to Tarski”, History and Philosophy of Logic,
vol. 19 (no. 4), 1998, pp. 227-234
“Report of an
Unsuccessful Search for Nonconceptual Content”, in E. Villanueva (ed.): Philosophical Issues IX: Concepts,
Ridgeview, Atascadero (Calif.), 1998, pp. 369-379
“La teoría de los modos infinitos de Spinoza”, Revista
Latinoamericana de Filosofía, vol. 23 (no. 2), 1997, pp. 295-318
“Two Problems for an Epistemicist View of Vagueness”, in E. Villanueva (ed.): Philosophical Issues VIII: Truth,
Ridgeview, Atascadero (Calif.), 1997, pp. 237-245
Review of M. García-Carpintero, Las Palabras, las Ideas y las Cosas, in Crítica,
vol. 29 (no.87), 1997, pp. 117-138
Tarski’s Definition of Logical
Consequence. Historical and Philosophical Aspects (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University), University Microfilms, Ann Arbor (Mich.), 1996, vii+212
pp.
“Tarski on Logical Consequence”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 37 (no. 1), 1996, pp.
125-151
“La teoría semántica de las lógicas de
condicionales de Stalnaker y Lewis”, Ágora, vol. 12 (no. 2), 1993, pp. 57-78
E-mail: mariogt@unam.mx
Phone number: (+52) (55) 5622 7248